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The task ahead
For the world to have a reasonable chance of  
avoiding the worst effects of  climate change, the 
challenge is have global emissions of  greenhouse 
gases peak by 2020 and then to reduce them to 
50% of  1990 levels by 2050. These goals have been 
articulated by international science and policy 
leaders – the second even by the heads of  state of  the 
G8 countries at their recent 2008 meeting in Japan. 
For industrialised countries, the challenge is much 
greater than just the global percentages. Figure 1, 
taken from the recently released report by Tony 
Blair and The Climate Group (Climate Group, 
2008), shows an illustrative set of  pathways for global 
emissions and shares of  this for industrialised and 
developing countries.
Lord Nicholas Stern points out in a very recent 
report (Stern, 2008), that what the global 50% 
by 2050 goal means ‘as a matter of  arithmetic’ is 
average global per capita emissions of  about 2 tonnes 
of  carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) by 2050 –  
and that if  there are any large economies emitting 
more than this, there need to be other equally large 
economies emitting commensurately less.2
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1 This article draws, in particular, from a briefing paper, The Architecture of a Global Climate 
Change Agreement, prepared as part of the Tony Blair/Climate Group ‘Breaking the Climate 
Deadlock’ Initiative (see http://www.theclimategroup.org/special_projects/breaking_the_
climate_deadlock/).
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Meeting the needs
The challenge in front of  the global community is to craft, 
agree and ratify a multilateral agreement that adequately 
addresses the scale of  the climate change problem. The 
agreement must therefore be able to meet the needs and 
expectations of  all countries and ‘voting’ publics. This also 
must be done in the context of  other imperatives that are 
bearing on country leaders, in particular energy security, 
water security, food security and sustainable development – 
and now, most recently, the global financial crisis.
To achieve, and be mindful of, these many objectives, 
of  necessity any agreement will have to be both very 
comprehensive and very flexible. Given the need for global 
emissions to peak by about 2020 (in the face of  current 
emissions growth trends), the agreement needs also to build 
on the international climate change policy that exists and 
is working. There is not the time to start with a new page. 
However, the sheer complexity of  the challenge also means 
that the agreement must additionally be open to innovation 
and diplomacy of  the highest levels.
Key elements of a global agreement
Taken together, these above points clearly signal the need 
for an agreement that has at its core both some quantitative 
elements and some ‘bigger picture’ elements. 
By quantitative, what is meant are elements that constrain 
emissions in a predictable way. This means a cap on the 
aggregate emissions of  industrialised countries. And it can 
mean other forms of  targets or commitments: for example, 
of  a sectoral nature in some key developing countries, or 
covering international aviation and marine ‘bunker’ fuels. 
Importantly, it is these quantitative elements that create the 
basis for the emergence of  a more robust and broad-based 
international carbon market. This is generally seen by experts 
to be a needed fundamental element of  a future climate 
change agreement because of  its ability to engage the world’s 
private sector and mobilise necessary levels of  investment 
worldwide in low carbon technologies and practices.
But these quantitative elements can be seen as ‘threatening’ 
in some circles. In industrialised countries they can be seen to 
exacerbate competitiveness concerns in key industry sectors, 
especially at a time of  economic slow-down and job losses. 
And for developing countries, any suggestion that emission 
constraints might place a cap on their right to industrialise and 
address their priority development concerns is an anathema. 
They can rightly point to the fact that current levels of  climate 
change have been caused by the emissions of  the developed 
world, that emissions in developing countries are typically 
just a fraction of  those in developed countries on a per capita 
basis and that growth in emissions in developing countries 
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• Electricity sector (e.g. % renewables, % CCS - 
ready coal power plants, etc)
• Vehicles sector (e.g. vehicle emissions intensity 
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intensive commodity sectors 
• Commitment to SD - PAMS in DCs  (with 
technology and financial support from ICs)
• Sustainable Forestry measures, e.g. REDD, with 
financial support from ICs (if not under main 
quantitative ‘deal’)
• Technology R&D cooperation agreements
• Cooperative technology diffusion agreements
2) Measures to facilitate adaptation planning and 
implementation, especially for the most vulnerable 
populations and ecosystems 
3) Financial mechanisms to provide support for 
adaptation, capacity building and technology 
deployment  
4) Enabling environments
• Creating conditions that attract investment
• Advancing ‘helpful’ measures in bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements     
LEGEND:
FBTs in ICs
Fixed and Binding Targets in 
Industrialised Countries
IBFCs
International Bunker 
Fuel commitments
SNLTs in DCs
some Sector No-Lose 
Targets in some 
Developing Countries – 
example sectors: 
• Electricity Generation
• Electricity Transmission & 
Distribution
• Emissions intensive commodities: 
(cement, iron and steel, aluminium)
• Oil and gas production (gas flaring)
• Other?   
REDD
Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation  
Enhanced CDM – 
type mechanism 
acts in the 
balance of the 
‘unconstrained’ 
space
Unconstrained
FBTs in ICs
SNLTs
for DCs
IBFCs IBFCs
OR?
 
REDD REDD
OR?
Figure 2: The two-sided architecture of a comprehensive and flexible agreement
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A possible scenario for their being on the 
‘bigger picture’ side would be if they struck 
a deal with the international community to 
voluntarily reduce or offset a certain percentage 
of their emissions.  
over the last few decades is frequently tied to the fact that 
emissions-intensive manufacturing of  products consumed in 
industrialised countries is now being done in their countries.
It is therefore unrealistic to expect agreement to be reached 
on a framework that is essentially just of  a quantitative 
‘managed emissions’ nature. Moreover, such quantitative 
elements and the carbon markets they engender do not, 
in themselves, ensure an adequate mitigation response. 
And dealing with the climate change challenge is not just 
about mitigation. There is a much bigger picture that an 
effective global agreement needs to address. Importantly, it 
is this ‘bigger picture’ side of  the agreement that provides 
the possibilities for the needed innovations, leadership and 
diplomacy. Some of  these ‘bigger picture’ elements will be 
important to help enable acceptance of  the elements on the 
quantitative side of  the agreement. In short, they are of  the 
type: ‘We will be prepared to do this as long as, in return, you 
do that.’ The proposal by the European Union in January 
2008 – ‘we can unilaterally agree to taking on a minus 20% 
target by 2020, but could go to minus 30% as part of  a 
broader multilateral agreement with others 
doing their part’ – can be seen in this light, 
albeit what ‘bigger picture’ elements they 
are seeking from other countries, both 
industrialised and developing, are not yet 
clearly set out.
But there is much more to the 
‘bigger picture’ side than just enabling 
the ‘quantitative’ side. By their nature, 
quantitative elements, especially those that 
rely on international carbon prices as a 
key driver for action, cannot be expected 
either to cover all sectors in all countries, or 
necessarily to achieve the full potential of  emissions reductions 
in those sectors that are covered. In some circumstances it will 
be the ‘bigger picture’ measures that may play the greatest 
role in achieving the potential mitigation outcomes.
And as noted, it is not all about mitigation. The effects of  
climate change are large and increasingly looming, especially 
for some of  the world’s most vulnerable populations and 
ecosystems. An effective global agreement must now also 
take a firm stance on means to address adaptation needs.
Figure 2 provides a depiction of  the two-sided architecture 
that is proposed here. However, especially on the ‘bigger 
picture’ side, it is not intended to be exhaustive of  possible 
innovative ideas for needed and helpful elements. It should 
be seen as high-level and generally illustrative. 
On the quantitative side, the emissions circles represent 
aggregate emission totals under the various forms of  
management. The difference in the edges of  these circles 
– i.e. of  the large ‘FBTs in ICs’ (fixed and binding targets 
in industrialised countries) circle compared with the three 
smaller circles – is intended to denote the fixed nature of  
the former and the likely rate-based nature of  the latter. In 
an emissions trading context, the trading unit associated 
with FBTs in ICs would be ‘allowances’ and for the other 
three it would be ‘emission credits’, where performance 
was better than the crediting baselines that these targets 
and commitments represent. In addition, as noted in the 
depiction, the remaining ‘unconstrained’ space is where 
current and future enhanced CDM (Clean Development 
Mechanism)-type activities could be undertaken and provide 
a supply of  credits into the FBTs in ICs circle to enable those 
countries to meet their targets at lower cost.
Further, with respect to the FBTs in ICs circle, such a 
circle is made up of  the aggregate of  the allowed emissions 
represented by the industrialised countries’ targets – e.g. the 
targets that Annex B countries agreed to under the Kyoto 
Protocol. This is shown as a single circle, and this may imply 
that this results from a single agreement that all industrialised 
countries are party to. But in practice this may be the sum of  
targets collectively negotiated by a group of  countries under 
such an agreement, plus others’ targets that may sit outside 
the multilateral agreement but, nevertheless, represent self-
imposed fixed and binding targets – for all or parts of  their 
economy.3 
This situation may necessarily result in some different 
emissions trading scheme ‘linkage rules’ between those in 
the collective and those outside. However, the overall point is 
that there is a sum of  allowed emissions stemming from the 
targets of  all these industrialised countries, and these form 
the basis for international emissions trading of  the cap-and-
trade variety among them.
Sector no-lose targets (SNLTs) for developing countries 
are expected to be of  an intensity nature (e.g. carbon dioxide 
(equivalent) per megawatt-hour of  electricity (CO2e/MWh) 
or per tonne of  cement). The no-lose nature of  these targets 
simply means that there is no compliance penalty if  the 
targets (intensity baselines) are not met. However, because 
the purpose of  such a mechanism is to significantly ‘scale up’ 
the inward flows of  carbon finance-supported low carbon 
technology (compared with the current CDM), these targets 
would be something that can reasonably be expected to be 
met and beaten. But this is not to suggest that they should 
be seen as overly soft targets opening the door to large credit 
generation for ‘likely to be done anyway’ actions. Given that 
these targets will be negotiated as part of  the quantitative 
agreement ‘package’, subsequent additionality assessments 
would not be required. This is one of  the means by which 
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this mechanism is different from any form of  CDM. 
In negotiating an acceptable intensity baseline, the process 
would be interested to know details of  all relevant factors by 
which a given developing country could improve its intensity 
in the sector prior to the point that carbon finance is to 
take over. In this way, there will be an expectation on the 
industrialised countries’ side that major developing countries 
will commit to some level of  self-funded mitigation efforts, 
rather than just have all their efforts positively incentivised by 
industrialised countries through carbon credits.
The nature of  possible international aviation and marine 
bunker fuel commitments (IBFCs) is somewhat less discernible. 
It is for this reason that they are shown as possibly occurring 
on either side of  the quantitative and ‘bigger picture’ divide 
line. If  on the quantitative side, this would imply some means 
had been negotiated to have these sectors accept (and be held 
to) some form of  a binding emissions target (whether of  a 
fixed or intensity nature). This would set the stage for these 
two sectors to be sellers into the international carbon market 
if  they met and beat their targets, and be buyers from it if  
they did not. 
A possible scenario for their being on the ‘bigger picture’ 
side would be if  they struck a deal with the international 
community to voluntarily reduce or offset a certain percentage 
of  their emissions. Their activity might therefore occur in the 
voluntary carbon market, not the compliance market that 
occurs through the elements on the compliance side of  this 
proposed agreement.
Similarly, on the issue of  reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), opinions 
currently are still quite divided as to whether this sector in 
developing countries should be one which receives its needed 
financial support through public sector (or even voluntary 
carbon market) funds, hence on the ‘bigger picture’ side. 
Or is it feasible to have its potential supply of  credits 
incorporated into the compliance carbon market – with the 
risk of  perhaps swamping the market and severely lowering 
the cost of  carbon?
A sectoral perspective
When considering the proposed two-sided architecture from 
a sectoral perspective, a number of  types of  groupings and 
linkages become apparent. This has usefully been elaborated 
in work of  the Pew Center on Global Climate Change on what 
they refer to as an integrated multi-track climate framework 
(Bodansky and Diringer, 2007). In a subsequent ‘background 
note’ on sectoral approaches (from which Figure 3 below is 
taken), they note that: 
 Sectoral approaches could sit alongside other types of  
action/commitments as elements of  a comprehensive 
post-2012 framework. For example, the framework could 
include absolute economy-wide targets for some countries; 
policy-based actions/commitments (sectoral or economy-
wide) for other countries; and one or more overlapping 
sectoral agreements (with different country groupings in 
each). (Pew Center, 2008)
In the illustration in Figure 3 above: 
• developed dountry A takes an absolute economy-wide 
target;
• developed country B takes a target and participates in one 
sectoral agreement;
• developed country C takes a target and participates in 
two sectoral agreements;
• developing country D takes a policy-based (possibly 
sectoral) action/commitment;
• developing country E participates in a sectoral agreement; 
and
• developing country F takes a policy-based (possibly 
sectoral) action/commitment and participates in a 
sectoral agreement.
The two-sided architecture depicted in Figure 2 is fully 
consistent with this sectoral concept helpfully set out here by 
the Pew Center.
Negotiation process issues
Leaders have affirmed a number of  times that the United 
Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the 
proper forum within which to conclude a comprehensive 
climate agreement. This process is looking to achieve its 
primary outcomes at the 15th meeting of  the Conference of  
the parties to the UNFCCC to be held in Copenhagen (COP 
15) at the end of  2009. In particular, it would be expected that 
all of  the quantitative elements of  the agreement shown in 
Figure 2 would be negotiated under the UNFCCC process.
However, it is quite feasible (indeed probably necessary) 
that some of  the agreements on the ‘bigger picture’ side might 
better be struck outside the UNFCCC process per se, but then 
be recognised as existing as the overall UNFCCC process 
‘package deal’ is coming together. These, for example, might 
be cooperative financing or technology sharing elements 
that complement those in the UNFCCC agreement – for 
example, agreed bilaterally between key countries or among 
smaller groups of  countries, or even among key industries 
operating in some countries. There might also be elements 
of  the agreement – for example, related to sustainable forest 
Figure 3: Possible means of engagement at a sector level
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management or international trade – which might be struck 
in other multilateral fora.
While this ‘inside and outside the UNFCCC’ model 
suggests a more complex negotiating process, it has the great 
advantage of  providing significant flexibility for the necessary 
diplomacy and leadership to bring an overall global deal 
together. In particular, it gets past the problem that the 
UNFCCC is a forum where it is only national governments 
at the negotiating table. A global climate change deal will 
need leadership initiatives also from international business, 
local government and civil society non-government groups 
at large. This is difficult when they can only be observers – 
and are out of  the room completely when the final deals are 
being done.
2 For reference, current per capita emissions of some large economies (and current average 
annual growth rates) are: United States 22T (0.4%); Russia 16T (1.2%); Japan 10T (0.7%); 
EU-27 10T (0.4%); Brazil 15T (0.2%); China 6T (2.7%); India 2T (2.8%).
3 A reality that faces negotiators is that the United States may, as with the Kyoto Protocol, 
struggle at home to ratify an international UN agreement. But this time around the signs 
are that, under a new administration, the US may agree to establish domestic targets and a 
binding internal emissions trading scheme.
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